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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L. W. FLYNN, dba L. W. FLYNN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
'
Plaintiff-AppellantCross Respondent

v.
W. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, ET AL.,

Case
No.
12855

Defendants-RespondentsCross Appellants

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover ( 1 ) lost profits ( 2)
damages for wrongful conversion of certain materials
owned by the plaintiff, (3) interest on said amounts
and (4) attorney's fees which the plaintiff Loyal
Flynn alleges he sustained when the defendants W.
P. Harlin Construction Company and M. Morrin &
Son Company, Inc. wrongfully breached their subcontract with the plaintiff in which the plaintiff was
to install certain concrete floors at the University of
Utah Biological Science Building in Salt Lake City,
Utah. [R. 1-7] This is also an action to recover relief
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under the Utah Bonding Statutes dealing with construction of public buildings pursuant to Section
14-1-1 et sequel UCA - 1953 as amended. [R. 4-5]
A counterclaim was filed asking for certain monies
which the defendants claimed they spent "over and
above" the subcontract price to complete the plaintiff's work. [R. 10-12]
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before a jury of eight ( 8)
members for five ( 5) days and seven ( 7) members
for two (2) days presided over by the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft on January 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and
31st and February 1, 1972. [R. 61-70] At the conclusion of the fifth day of trial one of the Jurors,
Norman N. Suaza, asked to be excused from service
for economic reasons. [ R. 68, 18 7 J Based upon this
request and upon stipulation by the parties, the court
ordered the trial to continue with seven members.
[R. 187 J This jury unanimously [R. 922-924] returned specal verdicts finding: ( 1) the defendants
had wrongfully breached their subcontract with the
plaintiff Loyal Flynn and the defendants were not
justified in ousting Mr. Flynn from the Biological
Science Building job site; (2) the plaintiff Loyal W.
Flynn was entitled to twenty thousand dollars
($20,000) damages for lost profits which he would
have realized had he been allowed to complete his
subcontract and (3) the plaintiff was entitled to
$5,000 damages for the reasonable market value
of the materials (plywood, 2 x 4's, etc.) which he

brought to the job site; but which were never returned
to him by the defandants nor paid for when they
finished the work. [R. 146-147] The jury found
against the defendants on all aspects of their counterclaim. [R. 146, 147, tf 1 and 3] The plaintiff Joe
Flynn's claim was settled during the trial; and he was
dismissed from the lawsuit for all practical purposes.
[R. 126] Thereafter on February 4, 1972, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft called the parties and counsel
to his court where he granted defendants' motion
for a directed verdict on the jury findings of lost
profits in the amount of twenty thousand dollars
C$20,000); but denied the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict on the jury's findings of C1) wrongful termination of the subcontract and (2) the award
of $5,000 for the defendants' wrongful conversion of
the plaintiff's materials. [R. 926-951 J The trial judge
refused to award attorney's fees to either party.
[R. 160, 163 «] 4] The plaintiff then filed his notice
of appeal appealing from «] s 2 and 4 of the judgment
on verdict [R. 171-172] and the defendants filed their
cross-appeal from t]s 1 and 3 of the said judgment.
[R. 175]

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to reverse the decision of
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft granting the defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to the lost profits
in the amount of $20,000 and asks this Honorable
Court to either enter its judgment or direct that judgment be entered by the trial court in accordance with
3

the jury verdict; together with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from August 25, 1966 [the date the
defendants admit they completed the plaintiff's subcontract work]; together with a reasonable attorney's
fees pursuant to Section 14-1-8 U CA - 19 5 3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts will be presente.d in a light most favorable to the plaintiff since the jury found for the
plaintiff. It is recognized there is a dispute on some
of the facts and defendants' brief will probably present the evidence differently on those matters. The
pertinent facts are presented under the following
argument headings which discuss both those issues
raised in the defendant's cross-appeal [R. 175] as
well as those in the plaintiff's appeal. [R. 171-172]
I

THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN
SUSTAINING THE JURY'S VERDICT WHICH
FOUND THE DEFENDANTS' TERMINATION OF
LOYAL FLYNN'S SUBCONTRACT AND THE
ACTION OF THE DEFENDANTS IN OUSTING MR.
FLYNN FROM THE JOB WAS WRONGFUL AND
COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE.
The trial judge instructed the jury in accordance
with the respective claims of the parties as they
related to the issue of wrongful termination of the
subcontract and accurately set forth what the jury
4

would or would not have to find in order to agree
with the parties' respective positions. Uns. #12, 13
& 14; R. 129-133] These instructions clearly protected
the defendants and are in accordance with the general law relating to wrongful breach of contract.
[ W eyhe-,i Construction Company v. Cox Construction
Co., 22 U.2d 365, 453 P. 2d 161 (1969); 13 Am Jur
2d 44, Building & Construction Contracts, §41 et
sequel "Substantial Performance"; 12 Am Jur, 961962, Contracts, §386 "Prevention of Performance."]
In W eyher, supra, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict for a subcontractor who was to
contract a portion of a state road facility by June
30th. The actual work was not completed until two
months later and the prime contractor refused to
pay. The subcontractor then commenced a lawsuit
for the balance due under the subcontract and also
for damages incident to the prime contractor's preventing the subcontractor from proceeding on schedule. The evidence showed the steel contractor upon
whom the subcontractor had to rely did not get his
steel at the site on time thereby making it impossible
for the subcontractor to complete his .work on time.
The Supreme Court cited from 16 ALR 3rd 1254
wherein it was stated: "It seems fairly well settled
that a general contractor is under an implied obligation not to hinder or delay performance by his
subcontractor and may incur liability for the latter's
damage if he does not take all the reasonable steps
to insure the job site is ready and that work proceeds
without undue delay."
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Based upon the evidence and the instrnctions
from the court, the jury in the instant case, returned
its special verdict # 1 finding the defendants HarlinMorrin were not justified under the facts and circumstances of this case in terminating Flynn's participation in the work under the subcontract. [ R. 146 J
This finding was amply supported by the record and
as the trial judge said in denying the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict on this special finding:
"I also find that Harlin & Morrin with a larger
crew, ... completed the [3rd] floor and the
roof in 60 additional working days. Four of
the 38 working days that Flynn had, he spent
in pouring cement on the 1st floor or at least
part of them and so his performance in doing
a substantial part of the second floor in 34
working days if we take out those 4 for the
work on the 1st floor and the basement, is
not so bad when compared to the fact that
Harlin & Morrin's own working crew, when
they took over, took about 30 days to complete
each of the other two floors, the 3rd and the
roof." [R. 934]
The record is replete with testimony showing
Flynn had to wait upon the defendant's own employees as well as several other subcontractors who
were behind in their schedules, thereby making it
impossible for Flynn to proceed.
The subcontract on page
would follow the schedule set
tractor. [Ex. 18-PJ When Mr.
bid on September 17, 1965, Mr.
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1-A provides Loyal
by the general conFlynn submitted his
Dan McCann, super-

intendent for the joint venture refened to a bar
graph located in his office showing the progress expected of the various subcontractors. This bar graph
was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 21-P and
items 5 [slab on grade] and 6 [suspended slabs] cover
Flynn's subcontract work. This chart showed the
basement and first floor being done by January 1,
1966, and the balance of the concrete work by N ovember 1, 1966. [R. 400, 767-768, 1022-1028] As will be
shown hereafter, the November, 1966, deadline was
substantially accelerated by the defendants.
The joint venture fell behind schedule from the
beginning. Although Mr. Harlin asked the plaintiff
to pour the cement on the basement and first floor
by January 1, 1966, and told him he could commence
work by December 1, 1965, on these projects,
[R. 1023] it soon appeared the joint venture was having trouble with its own employees and with the
other subcontractors whose work had to proceed Mr.
Flynn's. Exhibit 79-D is the defendants' job journal for
this project; and it reflects these other specialty trades
and subcontractors having fights among themselves
and delaying the job to such an extent they were not
ready for Mr. Flynn to commence his work until
February 3, 1966. [Ex. 79-DJ On cross-examination
Mr. Harlin goes through the job journal showing the
problems his own employees and other subcontractotrs
created for Flynn. [R. 249-277] Mr. Harlin admitted
the job site was not ready for Loyal to commence his
subcontract until February 3, 1966; [R. 290-291, 778780 J and further admitted Flynn was held up from
7

February 19, 1966, until March 25th because Harlin's
own employees and the other subcontractoirs were not
proceeding on schedule. [R. 352-353, 400-404, 799]
These problems and delays were also testified to insubstantial detail by Mr. Flynn. [R. 577-578, 627630, 654, 891-892, 901, 1028-1033, 1037-1040, 10621064, 1085]
Mr. Austin Scott was called as a witness for the
plaintiff. He had been Loyal
foreman and
had remained in charge of the Flynn subcontract
work after May 15, 1966, when Flynn was ousted
from the job. He stated Mr. Flynn was continually
plagued with delays and other problems caused by
Harlin-Morrin employees and by the other subcontractors; that these problems existed from the outset
of the job and continued during the time Loyal was
there. [ R. 690, 693 J He testified Harlin never complained to him about Loyal's work not being satisfactory nor did anyone else either during the time
Flynn was there or after he left. CR. 700, 721] He
stated most of Loyal's crews remained after May 15th
and continued to complete the work for HarlinMorrin in the same manner as they had done for Mr.
Flynn with no changes in design) procedure, etc.
CR. 688 J, and this fact was admitted by Harlin
[R. 339, 835 J, and Harlin's other subcontractors.
[R. 431-432]
The delays caused by Harlin's employees and
other subcontractors precipitated a meeting on April
18 1966 in which the officers from the joint venture

'

'
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as well as the other subcontractors were called together to try and work out a schedule that everybody could follow. [R. 672, 802] Mr. Ray Ward, chief
estimator for the joint venture, was assigned the
responsibility to coordinate the subcontractors' efforts
and let them know what would be expected in the
future. [R. 802] Mr. Ward took a set of the blueprints and in red pencil markings, he indicated the
dates by which the various subcontractors were to
have their jobs done. [Ex. 17-P, sheets S-2, S-3, etc.,
, R. 190, 672, 1015, 1017, 1018, 1062-1064] At this
meeting, Mr. Flynn agreed to pour an average of
7,000 sq ft of concrete each week and to complete
the second floor by May 6, 1966, provided the excavating and column and wall subcontractors were
sufficiently ahead of him so that he could do his work
without interference. [Ex. 53-PJ Each of the parties
forwarded letters to the other setting forth their
respective understandings reached at the April 18,
1966, meeting. [Ex. 52-P, 53-PJ
Mr. Flynn testified he complied with these requirements and in fact poured approximately 7800
sq ft of concrete from the date of the meeting on
April 18, 1966, until he was asked to leave the job
on May 13, 1966. [Ex. 22-P, R. 1061] In addition to
the amounts shown on Exhibit 22-P he testified he
should be given credit for an additional 3,000 ft on
the second floor perimeter beam which would increase the average weekly pour shown on the exhibit.
[ R. 648 J The defendants' exhibits confirmed the
plaintiff's figures. [Ex. 88-DJ
9

Mr. Flynn stated he completed forming and
shoring all of the second floor except for about 1400
sq ft by the time he left the job. [R. 603, 890-893]
He stated he was unable to complete this 1400 sq ft
because the other subcontractors were not sufficiently
ahead of him. [ R. 1060-1064 J It is clear from the
evidence the columns were not installed by the dates
indicated on Exhibit 17-P, p. S-3, nor was the excavating done as required therein. [R. 891-892] One
of the defendants' own photographs, Exhibit 74-D,
shows a thirty foot deep hole around a portion of the
building which made it impossible for Mr. Fiynn to
install his scaffolding materials to complete the construction of the perimeter beam on the second floor.
This hole was still not filled in by the time Flynn
left the job which is the date the photograph was
taken. Mr. Ray Ward confirmed that Mr. Flynn
would not be able to follow the schedule which he
put on the blueprints unless the other subcontractors
had completed their work by the time specified.
[R. 190-191 J All of the witnesses testified the other
subcontractors did not complete their work as scheduled. [R. 249-277, 356, 400-410, 800-804] The job
was also plagued with bad weather during this time
which prompted the joint venture to extend Mr.
Flynn's deadline for the second floor from May 6th
to May 10th.
The plaintiff had a contractor's specialty license
#7523 issued September 12, 1960, [R. 515-517, 527,
529, 1002] which authorized him to perform the
work called for in the subcontract. He had been
10

doing concrete construction work for his father Joe
Flynn, who had been in business for twenty-five
years. CR. 533, 534, 550, Ex. 16-PJ He testified in
substantial detail how he computed his bid at $86,000,
the suppliers he contacted, and introduced into evidence a design he created for the beam construction.
[R. 593, 644-645, 1067, Ex. 64-PJ
Mr. Flynn explained to the jury step by step just
how he formed, shored and poured concrete. [R.
576, 1046-1060, 1067-1080] This testimony allowed
the jury to determine for themselves whether or not
Mr. Flynn knew what he was doing. He further
stated all of his work was double-checked by HarlinMorrin's superintendent and by either the project
engineer, Morris Page; the architect, William
Thomas, or the Utah State Building Board inspector,
vVilson Harris; and he could not pour until these men
were satisfied everything was ready. CR. 1051-1053 J
Consequently any errors in his pours were those
of the joint venture and not Mr. Flynn. Other witnesses admitted Loyal's work was double-checked by
these other people. CR. 386-387, 405-406, 692, 722,
852-854]
The plaintiff did admit two times when he felt
his work was below what he would consider acceptable standards. One of these times involved a pour
on the 2nd floor perimeter beam on April 14, 1966.
He had ben told to prepare the said area because
Harlin-Morrin needed the cement pump in Provo at
4:30 that afternoon. CR. 1097-1101 J He told the
general contractor the ground was not ready for the
11

pour, but the general contractor insisted; so Loyal
completed the pour and still did a fairly good job.
[R. 623, 1097-1101 J The other problem involved a
request by the superintendent to form a certain area
one way whereas Loyal felt it should be done another
way. The forming was done as required by the
superintendent and it subsequently failed. The superintendent ordered it done the second time and it
failed again. Finally the plaintiff came out on a
Saturday and did the forming the way he felt it
should be done and it held. CR. 622, 702, 900-901,
1100]
Mr. Harlin was president of the W. P. Harlin
Construction Company. [R. 755 J He stated his job
was to "push" the people to get the job done. [R. 756]
He said he knew Loyal Flynn could not post a surety
bond as called for in paragraph 3 of the subcontract
so they crossed out this requirement. [Ex. 18-P, paragraph 3, R. 759-760] Flynn testified he told Harlin
he would be bringing materials to the job site from
the Midvale Elementary and Trade Tech projects
[R. 1092-1093] and would meet his payroll with
funds he had coming from a construction job at Hill
Air Force Base. CR. 1089-1090] This was conditioned
on his being able to begin work by December 1, 1965
and being able to draw on his subcontract pursuant
to paragraph 8 thereof after that time. CR. 10881090]. Mr. Harlin seemed satisfied with these
arrangements. CR. 1092-1093]. Although Harlin had
told Flynn he could commence work by December
1, 1965 [R. 1023], the joint venture was not ready
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for Flynn to commence his subcontract until February 3, 1966. [R. 780] Consequently the money from
the Hill Air Force Base job went for other purposes
[R. 1089]; and Mr. Harlin agreed to pay Flynn's
employees directly and to pick up his payroll after
Flynn commenced working. [R. 760-761, 1089-1097]
The plaintiff also denied he had ever poured on top
of sawdust or wires. [R. 1114-1115]
Under the circumstances set forth above and
pursuant to the court's instructions, it is submitted
there was substantial, competent evidence to support
the jury verdict on the issue of wrongful termination.
Mr. Harlin himself stated it would take a reasonable concrete crew on this job site eleven days to
form and pour 9,000 sq ft. [R. 282-283] When judged
against this criterion, Mr. Flynn's record of pouring
an average of more than 7800 sq ft per week-which
consisted of only five working days - is superb!
[Ex. 22-PJ Furthermore Harlin admitted his only
complaint over Flynn's work was his rate of progress
on the second floor and he was not objecting to his
work on the basement or first floor. [R. 785, 789, 800,
810, 839-840. J Clearly Mr. Flynn cannot be expected
to do the impossible; and if his performance on finishing the 2nd floor was prevented by the joint venture's
own employees or by other subcontractors, as it was
in this case, the joint venture was certainty arbitrary
in terminating the subcontract.

13

II

THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN SUSTAINING THE JURY'S VERDICT OF $5,000.00 AS
A REASONABLE MARKET VALUE OF THE MATERIALS WHICH LOYAL FLYNN OWNED AND
WHICH HE FURNISHED TO THE JOB SITE, BUT
WHICH WERE NEVER PAID FOR NOR RETURNED
BY THE DEFENDANTS WHEN THE WORK WAS
COMPLETED.
The jury returned a verdict awarding $5,000.00
as the reasonable fair market value of certain -plywood and other lumber materials which Loyal Flynn
brought to the Biological Science job site, but which
were never returned to him nor paid for by the
defendants when they completed the plaintiff's subcontract on or about August 25, 1966. CR. 147] Loyal
produced Exhibits 48-P & 84-P showing the costs of
new and used materials which he brought to the job
site.
Exhibit 84-P reads as follows:
"Lumber material Flynn brought to job site"
B-B Form PlywoodBurton Lumber

35,000 sq. ft. (new)

Trade Tech &
Midvale School

15,000 sq. ft. (used)

Plywood Cost
Jan. - May, 1966

14

(new cost) 20 cents
p/sq. ft.

2" X 1O" -

2" X 4" Material35,00 brd. ft. (new)

Burton Lumber
Trade Tech. &
Midvale School

15, 000 brd. ft. (used)
(new cost $105.00
p I 1000 brd. ft.

Mr. Flynn's witnesses as well as those of the
defendants' fixed the value of these materials in
a used condition [which would exist after the subcontract work was completed] at anywhere from
30% of new cost prices to as high as 75%. The
$5,000.00 special verdict returned by the jury indicates they used a figure less than 50% which was
well within the evidence. Flynn testified none of
the items on Ex. 48-P had ever been returned to him
[ R. 642 J and this fact was admitted by Harlin.
[R. 856]
The plaintiff testified the plywood described in
his exhibit 84-P was 3 I 4 inch BB form plywood,
some of which had come from Midvale Elementary
School and the Trade Technical projects when he
purchased it from his father Joe Flynn. [R. 530-545,
552-560, 587, 1002-1011, 1014] Both he and Joe
stated the materials had been used only three times
when Loyal took them to the Biological Science Building. [R. 535, 1004] The plaintiff also testified he
purchased a substantial amount of new plywood,
2 X 4's and 2 X 1 O's from Burton Lumber Company
for use with his subcontract. [Exs. 47-P, 48-P, 84-P,
88-D & 90-DJ He said this Burton Lumber Company
15

plywood had been used only once on the 2nd floor
when he left the job and would have been used only
three or four more times in completing the subcontract. [R. 575, 1072-1073] Flynn testified he
could have completed his subcontract work with the
lumber and other materials he had on the job site
on May 13, 1966; and it would not be necessary to
order any more materials. [R. 744, 1080-1081 J
The plaintiff testified he obtained the figures
shown on Exhibit 84-P from the blueprints, the plans_
and specifications and other documents he had in his
possesion [R. 355-356]; and he testified as to how
he arrived at the new prices for the plywood and other
lumber materials. [R. 370-373] The defendants had
no objections to Exhibit 84-P being introduced into
evidence nor to any of the information contained
thereon. [R. 368, 747] Consequently any objection
they might have had to the admissibility of this evidence was waived; and the jury had a right to use
all of the figures in this exhibit in arriving at their
special verdict #4.
Sterling Purser appeared as an expert witness for
the plaintiff. [R. 747] Mr. Purser was the president
and 50% owner of Apex Building Specialties, a business in Salt Lake County concerned with buying,
selling and renting used and new building materials.
He gave the reasons for his expert opinion that BB
form plywood would be worth 75% of the new price
if it had been used three or four times; and 50% of the
new price if it had been used ten or fifteen times
or more [R. 747-753]
16

Mr. Flynn stated he asked the defendants' own
superintendent, Mr. Harold Anderson what a reasonable value of the used plywood materials would be
so that he could agree on a price with his father Joe
Flynn for the materials when he purchased them
from the Trade Tech. and Midvale jobs. He said
Mr. Anderson told him the value of used plywood
would be 50% of the original new cost [R. 1010]; and
this admission alone would justify the jury verdict.
Loyal Flynn further testified he had been in the
concrete construction business since 1960 and had
used BB form plywood in the past and that based
upon his familiarity with this plywood, his experience
in the concrete construction business, and other
people he had talked to, it was his opinion the BB
form plywood could be used 50 to 100 times [R.
1006], and the 2x4's and 2x10's more than a hundred times. [R. 373, 374]
Joe Flynn, the father of the plaintiff Loyal Flynn
testified he had been in the concrete and cement
business for 20 to 25 years; that he had used BB form
plywood many times in his business and was using
it at the Trade Tech. & Midvale jobs; that in his experience he's used it more than 50 times. [R. 533-545]
On cross-examination he stated the Trade Tech.
plywood had not been cut up in any way. [R. 522557]
Austin Scott was called as a witness for the plaintiff. [R. 686] This fifty-nine year old man had been
doing carpentry work for twenty years and most of
17

this time he had worked on jobs involving concrete
and cement floors. CR. 68 7 J He was one of Flynn's
employees on the Biological Science job and was asked
by the joint venture to remain on as foreman after
Loyal left on May 13, 1966. CR. 687] He said he
had helped Loyal unload several truck loads of 3 I 4
inch BB form plywood from the Midvale Elementary
job and the Trade Tech. School and that if this plywood is taken care of properly it can be used twenty
to thirty times. CR. 688-694] He emphasized Loyal
Flynn oiled the plywood very carefully because it
belonged to him and he wanted it to last through the
job. CR. 701 J He stated the plywood and other forming materials which Mr. Flynn brought to the job
would have been adequate in his opinion to have
completed the subcontract work if it was properly
taken care of by Harlin's crews. CR. 701, 744] On
cross-examination he stated even though the plywood
was in a few cases cut up for the beam sides, it could
be used over and over again after the first cut. CR.
719-720, 731-732] Finally, Mr. Scott testified Loyal
Flynn's BB form plywood was used about ten times
throughout the Biological Science Building while he
was there. CR. 737] He said when he kft the job after
the building was completed, the plywood and shoring
materials were still very useable and they could be
used twenty to thirty times or even more than that.
CR. 695, 737 J Mr. Scott said the joint venture had
used some of Loyal's materials for woirk outside the
scope of Loyal's subcontract CR. 738 J and had needlessly damaged other parts of the said materials.
CR. 701-702]
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lVIr. Ray VVard was the chief estimator for the
joint venture. CR. 657] He testified if the BB form
plywood is properly oiled it would have a used value
as high as 75% of its new cost. CR. 665-667] As the
trial judge noted, the defendants' own job journal,
Exhibit 79-D indicates the defendants purchased 55
gallons of preservative oH after May 15, 1966, to care
for the plywood. CR. 937]
The defendants called Marion Tamb as a witness. [R. 411 J It was his responsibility to install the
concrete columns which were constructed between
the floors. [R. 411-413 J He said the BB form plywood
he used was the same as Loyal Flynn used; that it
served the same purposes in his columns as it did in
Loyal's beams; and that he was able to use his
plywood repeatedly throughout the construction of
the Biological Science Building and it was still very
usable when the job was finished. [R. 417-428] It
follows Loyal's plywood would have been just as
usable.
Exhibit 79-D is the defendant's job journal for
the Biological Science Building project. The entry on
August 23rd in this job journal states the joint venture rented a flat bed truck for a month to take the
scaffolding and lumber to their yards. This clearly
indicates there must have been a substantial amount
of lumber materials left on that day. The general
contractor stated Loyal Flynn's subcontract was completed by Harlin's crews about this same time.
CR. 864] Since the defendants refused to pay for
these materials or to return them to Flynn, it was
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impossible for Flynn to gain access to them for
appraisal purposes. It is interesting the defendants
did not offer any evidence of the value of the lumber
materials on the date of their conversion except Exhibit 90-D which Harlin stated was just a big guess
to give Flynn the benefit of the doubt. CR. 314] Since
the defendants had the materials in their possession
throughout the job, why didn't they produce some
evidence as to how much material remained after
August 25, 1966 and what its appraised value was?
In Exhibit 90-D the defendants admitted the
value of used plywood would be 30% of the new cost
price. [R. 229] Mr. Harlin stated he was willing to
give Loyal credit for this amount on materials Harlin
purchased after Loyal left but not on the Burton Lumber Company invoices; even though he admitted the
Burton Lumber Company material had been used
on only one more floor than the Pat Harlin Company
materials. [R. 315 J This exhibit 90-D shows the
plaintiff was entitled to some percentage credit for
the lumber materials; and it was a simple matter
for the jury to determine how much. [R. 856]
The court's instruction #18 was an accurate
statement of the law pertaining to this matter. The
court charged the jury to determine the fair market
value of the property remaining at the conclusion of
the subcontract work and any other material which
had been needlessly wasted by Harlin-Morrin. [R.
139] This instruction accurately sets forth the proper
measure of damages relating to the value of converted
property which is the reasonable fair market value of
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the property at the time of the conversion. Lowe v.
Rosenlof, 12 U.2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 <1961)
Based on the testimony of the foregoing witnesses, the jury could reasonably find Loyal Flynn's
lumber materials would have lasted throughout the
entire contract job and could have been returned to
him with only three to six uses depending on whether
we are talking about the new lumber materials from
Burton Lumber Co. or the used lumber from Joe
Flynn's jobs. This being the case the reasonable
market value at the end of the subcontract would have
been equal to at least 50% of the new cost price. This
means the 50,000 square feet of plywood materials
shown on Exhibit 84-P would have ben worth onehalf of their new cost or 10 cents per square foot.
Consequently the plywood materials alone would
have a reasonable fair market value of $5,000.00
as stated in the jury's special verdict. ER. 147]
In addition to the plywood, the 2 X 4's, 2 X 10's
and other lumber material of 50,000 board feet would
have had a used fair market value of $52.50 per 1,000
board feet or an additional $2,625.00.
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III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF LOST PROFITS AND
THEREBY TAKING THE CASE AWAY FROM THE
JURY BECAUSE THE JURY VERDICT WAS BASED
UPON SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD PRESENTED DURING A SEVEN
DAY TRIAL CONSUMING NINE HUNDRED C900)
PAGES OF TESTIMONY VVITH NEARLY ONE
HUNDRED C100) EXHIBITS OFFERED AND TEN
C10) WITNESSES APPEARING; AND BECAUSE
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENC VIEvVS IT IN A LIGHT MOST FA VO RAB LE
TO THE DEFENDANTS RATHER THAN TO THE
PLAINTIFF AND IS BASED UPON SEVERAL
ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS VVHICH ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
1. Nature of a motion for directed verdict.
vVhen the plaintiff rested his case in chief, the defendants made a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds there was insufficient evidence
to let the case go to the jury. [R. 395 J After counsel
for the defendants had discussed the evidence he felt
supported this motion, the trial judge denied the
motion with these remarks:
"THE COURT: Well I think that is a good
argument to the jury but the position I am in,
Mr. Pratt, is that there is a dispute in our
interpretation of his testimony and the figures
as to the amount of work done and if I were
to take this from the jury, the Supreme Court
would send it back for another trial, I think.
So I think maybe because of the disputes in
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the extent of the work he had completed
when he left the job, that there is a matter for
the jury to decide and would be argument to
the jury to make. . . . This case, as far as I
am concerned, is going to the jury. We are
not going to spend a week's time trying a jury
case and not letting it go to the jury when I
think we have got disputed factual questions
to be decided." [R. 398 line 16-24; 399, line
7-10] Emphasis added.
It is clear the trial judge acknowledged several
disputed questions of fact which existed at the time
the plaintiff rested. These questions were not cleared
up by any of the defendants' witnesses.
The defendants then made a motion for a
cl irected verdict at the end of the trial; [ R. 914 J and
the trial judge stated he would reserve any ruling on
this matter until after the jury returned its verdict.
[R. 916]
The jury returned its special verdict on February 1, 1972, awarding to the plaintiff $20,000 as lost
profits together with $5,000 as the reasonable market
value of the lumber materials at the time they were
converted by defendants. [R. 146-147] On February
4, 1972, the trial judge called both counsel and respective parties into his chambers and proceeded to rule
on the defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
IR. 927-951] Based upon his review of the evidence,
the judge denied the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict upon paragraphs 1 and 4 of the jury's
special verdict. These paragraphs dealt with wrongful termination of the subcontract and with $5,000
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--damages for wrongful conversion of materials. [R.
146-147] The court then granted the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict as to paragraph 2 of
the special verdict and thereby took the case away
from the jury insofar as the $20,000 damages for lost
profits was concerned. [R. 163, 927-951]
As one reads pages 938-950 of the record, it
becomes clear the court's decision as to the damages
for lost profits was based solely on the fact the court
felt ( 1 ) there were 5, 740 sq ft of the second floor left
to be formed and shored when Flynn was asked to
leave the job on May 13, 1966, and (2) Flynn had
done absolutely no work whatsoever on the third
floor. CR. 940] The court admitted he had to use
some assumptions in order to arrive at these two conclusions. [R. 942, 944-946, 948] Based upon the
amount of work which the court felt Mr. Flynn had
done, he concluded that had Mr. Flynn been permitted to remain on the job, he would have spent
more money than his subcontract price entitled him
to receive from the defendants; and therefore he had
nothing coming from the defendants; and therefore
he was not entitled to any damages for lost profits.
[R. 941-948]
The plaintiff submits there is ample evidence in
the record to support the jury verdict as will be
pointed out hereinafter; and further submits that in
substituting his judgment for that of the jury, the
trial judge has done exactly what this Supreme Court
stated should not be done in a case that was decided
on February 10, 1972, or about the same time the
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trial judge made his decision in the instant case.
Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
27 U. 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 C1972)
In Ewell, the Supreme Court stated:
"In preface to a discussion of the various contentions of the appellant, it should be said
that they have indulged in a euphoric fallacy
so common to losing litigants: a blight persistence in assuming that the facts are as they
desire to see them, rather than as they were
seen by the jury. It therefore seems necessary
to reiterate the basic rule of review: that we
are obliged to survey the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences that could fairly be
drawn therefrom in the light favorable to
the verdict .... "
The plaintiff made a demand for a jury trial
and a jury was duly empaneled in this case. [R. 40,
49-50, 71. See also Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sections
10 and 11, Rule 38 URCP.J Under these circumstances, one would naturally expect the jury would
be the sole triers of the facts. However, after nine
hundred pages of testimony, the court on R. 938-950
says his analysis of the evidence leads to a conclusion
different from that reached by the jury; and although
the jury unanimously found all issues in favor of the
plaintiff, [R. 922-924] the trial judge said the evidence was so clear no reasonable persons could
possibly disagree with his conclusion. [R. 947-948]
Rule 50 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
as amended in 1965 specifies a motion for a directed
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verdict shall state the specific grounds therefore, and
it is clear the only ground raised by the defendants
was the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury's
findings. [R. 395 J In this sense the motion for a
directed verdict is substantially different from a
motion for a new trial in which errors in instructions,
rulings on admissibility of the evidence, and other
errors are cited. In a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial judge pits his judgment on findings of facts,
credibility of witnesses, etc. against the minds of the
jurors.
The Utah Supreme Court has held in deciding
a motion for a directed verdict, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the motion is directed and must
resolve every contraverted fact in his favor. Boshkovich v. Utah Const. Co., 123 U 387, 259 P. 2d 885,
887 ( 1953) The court has also held in directing a
verdict the court must examine the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party against whom the
evidence is intended; and it is not province of the
trial judge to weigh or determine the preponderance
of the evidence. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 U. 204, 240
P. 2d 491 0952).
Even a casual reading of the record, pp. 938-950,
shows the trial judge in the instant case did in fact
weigh or determine the preponderance of the evidence and he thereby substituted his judgment for
that of the jury; notwithstanding he had instructed
the jury they were the sole judges of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the

26

evidence. [Inst. No.s 4 & 5, R. 121, 122] The trial
judge said he had spent four nights and the weekend
during the trial preparing these instructions [R. 915]
and the plaintiff submits Instructions 4 and 5 are the
law of this case insofar as the duty of the jury is concerned. It is a mystery to the plaintiff why the trial
judge did not follow this law and why he considered
the verdict of the jury as advisory only.
In the instant case, the trial judge stated he had
not talked to any members of the jury so he had no
way of knowing what evidence the jury was looking
at to determine the $20,000.00 lost profit verdict.
[ R. 931 J The trial judge seemed to be preoccupied
with certain assumptions he made after reading the
defendants' job journal; however as stated in Scott
v. Austin, 47 Utah 248, 152Pacific1178 (1915), even
the Supreme Court cannot pass upon the weight of
the evidence regardless of whether it is presented to
the trial court in oral or documentary form.
2. Correct measure of damages. The correct
measure of damages in cases of wrongful breach of
a construction contract is the contract price together
with any change orders less the amount of money
the person would have necessarily expended in fully
performing his contract. Ralph E. Keller v. Deseret
l\iortuary Company, 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P. 2d 197
( 1969); Flynn v. Shocker Construction Co., et al,
23 Utah 2d 140, 459 P. 2d 433 (1969); Weyher Construction Company v. Cox Construction Co. Inc., 22
Utah 2d 365, 453 P. 2d 161 (1969); McCormick on
Damages, Hornbook Series, Section 142.
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In Keller, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
allowed a subcontractor to collect damages for his lost
profit when the general contractor had unlawfully
prevented him from completing the job. The court
said:
"Under the circumstances here shown, where
the plaintiff contractor had done the part of
the work he had performed in a satisfactory
and workmanlike manner, and was not himself at fault in the failure to complete it, we
see no error or impropriety in the trial court's
awarding him damages based upon the total
amount promised for the project, less the
reasonable costs of completing it."
In the instant case the jury found Loyal Flynn had
performed his work in a satisfactory and workmanlike manner and there was no justification for the
joint venture terminating his subcontract. Consequently the citation from Keller stating the correct
measure of damages would apply with equal force
to the instant case.

3. Court's instructions to the jury as to measure
of damages. The trial judge instructed the jury in
accordance with the proper measure of damages as
set forth supra. Clnst. Nos. 13 & 16, R. 131, 136]
Instiuction No. 13 CR. 131 J provides in part as
foJlOV/S:

"I'or the work so contracted for, Harlin-Mocrrin
to pay Flynn $86,000, which by a
sury;cqucnt change order for additional work,
was increased to $88,377.44. Under such
contrnct if Flynn had completed the work to
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be done, and if he were able to complete the
contract at a cost less than $88,377.44, the
difference would have been his profit, while
if his own cost to complete the work exceeded
the contract amount, the loss would be his to
bear .... "
4. What the evidence shows regarding necessary
costs to complete the plaintiff's subcontract. Exhibit
48-P shows the cost of the materials Loyal Flynn
brought to the job site to be $20,215.88. The plaintiff
testified these materials would have been adequate to
have completed the remaining portion of his subcontract and he would not have needed to purchase
additional materials. CR. 1080-1081 J This conclusion
was confirmed by Mr. Austin Scott, one of Flynn's
employees, who remained on as foreman of Harlin's
crew after Flynn was ousted from the job. CR. 701,
744. See also discussion of materials under Argument
II, supra in this brief. J
As far as total labor costs are concerned, Exhibit
63-P sets forth all amounts which had been paid by
either Flynn or Harlin for labor costs through May
15, 1966. The total on this exhibit is $18,661.88. The
figures set forth on this exhibit are taken from the
actual daily time records for each of the men working
as those time records are set forth in Exhibits 39-P
and 40-P. CR. 1040-104,2] Thus there can be no
dispute as to the amounts that were paid by the
defendants to the plaintiff's crews. The testimony is
that the figures on Exhibit 40-P represent gross wages.
CR. 1040] In addition to these figures there would
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be an 11% add-on for public liability [2%J, unemployment costs [2.5%J, FICA [4.2%] and workman compensation C2.3%J. CR. 229] Eleven percent
of $18,661.88 is $2,052.81 which when added to the
former figures makes a pre-May 15th total cost for
labor plus state charges of $20,714.69.
The total amount defendants owed Flynn if he
had completed his subcontract would be the original
price of $86,000 [Ex. 18-PJ together with $2,377.44
for the change order [Ex. 41-PJ or $88,3777 .44. The
pre-May 15th costs for materials [$20,215.88] and
labor [$20,714.69] are $40,930.37. If we subtract
these pre-May 15th figures from the total contract
price including the charge order we have a balance
of $47,446.87 left to complete the subcontract work.
Therefore in order to justify a $20,000 jury verdict for
lost profits, the plaintiff could still spend an additional
$27,446.87 for labor costs after May 13, 1966, or some
$7,000 more than he had already expended for labor
when he was ousted from the job.
Mr. Flynn testified it would have cost less for
labor to complete the subcontract after May 13, 1966,
than he had already paid out. [R. 601, 614-618, 10801081 J He stated this was true because the initial cost
went into moving the materials from Trade Tech
and the Midvale job, getting the forming and shoring
materials cut up into the right sizes and organizing
his crews to wotrk efficiently. [R. 598-599, 1081 J He
also stated there were some instances prior to May
15th when his crews were not able to work even
though they were on the job site and this increased
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his labor costs. This condition was caused by the
other subcontracto;rs and Mr. Harlin's own men not
being sufficiently far ahead for him to move forward.
[R. 901 J By May 15th, many of these problems had
been overcome as pointed out in former arguments in
this brief and the work was moving forward with
greater efficiency. The fact that these initial costs
are substantial and are expended early in the work
is also admitted by the defendants' chief estimator,
Mr. Ray Ward. [R. 675-676], and by Harlin himself.
CR. 841-842].
The "Monthly Estimates of Work Done" which
were submitted by the general contractor to the architect, reviewed by the architect and submitted to the
owner also clearly show on May 13th, 1966, Flynn's
subcontract was 50% complete. [R. 660, 1096, 1097,
Ex. 51-PJ Mr. Flynn's work is shown as items 5 and
6 on Exhibit 51-P. Page #6 of this exhibit shows that
slabs on grade were 85% complete and the suspended
slabs were 50% complete as of May 23, 1966. The
superintendent arrived at this amount of completion
by checking the actual work that had been done. The
architect then conducted a second check before he
sent the estimates to the owner. [R. 662-664] Even
though the general contractocr was receiving these
progress payments from the owner, he never paid
Loyal Flynn personally any amount whatsoever as
required by paragraph 8 of the subcontract. [R. 10931094]. And although he paid Loyal's employees and
lumber materials, it is clear these payments were less
than what he received from the owner. These
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---monthly estimates compare favoirably with Flynn's
testimony that he had completed 50% of his subcontract work by May 13, 1966 and with Austin
Scott's testimony that 40% was completed. [R. 704705 J
Loyal Flynn testified he had a meeting with the
defendants chief estimator Ray Ward about the time
Flynn left the job on May 13, 1966 at which time
Mr. Ward programmed an additional $30,000 iu
labor costs for Flynn to complete his subcontract.
[R. 1109-1110] Mr. Ward admitted sometime before
Loyal left the job, Ward went to the Biological Science
Building and estimated what ·work he felt remained
to be done on Flynn's subcontract. [ 192, 477, 466,
674] He testified he did not have any records showing how much was done on the second [R. 205 J or
third floors [R. 207] but based on his analysis of the
situation as it then existed, he estimated it would cost
$30,000 for Flynn to complete the remaining portion
of his subcontract work. [R. 201, 204-205 J He then
conceded if we used his figures of $30,000 together
with what Flynn had already expended for labor and
materials, an $18;000 profit would be justified. [R.
202] This testimony clearly shows that $27,446.87
[allowable labor costs to product a $20,000 profit,
supra] was not out of line with Mr. Ward's $30,000
figure; and the said $20,000 profit would be justified
from the testimony of defendants' own witness.
It is interesting the defendants did not produce
any evidence dealing with their original estimate of
what it would cost them to do the work specified in
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the Flynn subcontract if they had done it themselves
rather than subcontracting it out. The defendants
admitted this information concerning their original
estimates was in their office records. However when
each of their witnesses was asked for this information,
they stated they did not have the papers with them.
ER. 280-281, 659, 683-684, 774-775, 830] If Mr.
Flynn's $20,000 lost profit picture had been out of
line, why didn't the defendants' introduce their own
original estimate for this work or at least produce
some evidence that in the building construction trade
or industry a $20,000 profit would be out of line.
The defendants' chief estimator testified Loyal
Flynn's original bid was not out of line. ER. 664-665]

5. Why the trial judge's analysis of the evidence
zs wrong. The plaintiff submits the trial judge indulged in several erroneous assumptions which make
it clear his cost analysis is faulty, and further, the
trial judge reviewed the evidence in a light most
favorable to the defendants instead of the plaintiff,
as he was required to do.
The trial judge's first erroneous assumption is
that Loyal Flynn did absolutely no work of any kind
on the third floor, either scaffolding, forming, shoring or pouring. On page 940 of the record, the trial
judge stated:
"Now I think it is absolutely manifest that
Flynn did not in fact frame and pour anything on the third floo;r while he was there,
and if there is one thing in this case that I am
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certain about, it is that, and in my opinion,
Mr. Flynn is entitled to absolutely no credit
in computations for anything done on the
third floor."
On page 948 of the record, he says:
"There was no time spent in framing out anything on the third floor and there is no evidence in this record, gentlemen, that I can
see and I have labOlred over it and I had no
trial to try in the last two days and I have
spent all of my time going through these
records."
And on page 949, he said:

"I have sensed during the trial that there was
no real proof without having examined the
diary of any woll:'k having been done on the
third floor."
Not only did Mr. Flynn [R. 581, 603-605, 650,
1102] and Mr. Austin Scott, [R. 699, 736] describe
the work Loyal had done on the third floor; but even
Mr. Harlin himself finally admitted on cross-examination that Flynn had done some work on the third
floor. [R. 845, 847] Mr. Harlin initially said no
work had been done on the third floor; however, after
he looked at his own photographs, he admitted some
work had been done, [R. 294, 297, 301-302, 851, 8551
and further admitted he had no way of telling
exactly how much was done on the third floor. Exhibit 78-D is a photograph taken by Mr. Harlin's
superintendent, Dan McCann, on May 13, 1966,
sometjme during the day while Loyal was still on
the job. Since the other photographs were taken
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about 1:30 p. [Ex. 72-D, 80-DJ it would be reasonable
to assume Exhibit 78-D was also taken at that time.
Exhibit 78-D shows substantial scaffolding, forming and shoring materials between the second and
third floors at the north end of the building and Mr.
Harlin admitted all of this work was done by Flynn.
Exactly how much work had been done was for the
jury to decide. Flynn stated he formed and shored
approximately one-fourth of the third floor which
would be 7500 sq ft. [R. 581, 603-605, 650, 1102]
Austin Scott who was there throughout the entire
project and who worked as a foreman of the cement
crew after Mr. Flynn left, testified Flynn had formed
and shored 25%-33% of the third floor by the time
he was ousted from the job on May 13th. CR. 699,
736] How the trial judge could say Flynn was
entitled to absolutely no credit in computations for
anything done on the third floor is a mystery to the
plaintiff!
Loyal Flynn introduced some photographs he
stated had been taken on May 17th, 1966, or the
foHowing Tuesday after he was ousted from the job
on Friday. CR. 1036-1037] Exs. (24-38)-P Exhibits
26-P, 27-P, 28-P, 29-P, 30-P and 37-P clearly show
scaffolding and forming and shoring materials up on
the north end of the second floor to support the third
flooLr. Loyal Flynn testified this represented work he
had done while he was there. [R. 650, 1102] The
trial judge said he felt all of the forming and shoring
and scaffolding work shown in these photographs
was done by Harlin-Morrin crews. However, the
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journal entry clearly shows May 23rd was the first
mention of any decking and beam work being done
by Harlin's crews on the third floor. [Ex. 79-DJ
Furthermore Exhibit 78-D which is the photograph
taken by Harlin's own superintendent the last day
Loyal Flynn was on the job shows the same forming
and shoring work on the third floor as it is shown
on Loyal Flynn's photographs, Exhibits (26-30)-P
and 37-P; and this makes it abundantly clear the
work on the third floor as shown in the plaintiff's
photographs was done by Flynn and not Harlin.
The next erroneous assumption indulged in by
the trial judge deals with the amount of work which
was completed on the second floor. All of the parties
admit Loyal Flynn had formed, shored and poured
24,660 sq ft on the second floor. [Exs. 88-D, 91-D,
92-DJ In addition, Flynn testified he had formed
and shored the balance of the second floor except for
two small areas totaling 800 sq ft and 600 sq ft, as
shown in defendants' photographs Exhibits 74-D and
77-D. [R. 603, 890-893, 1060-1064] Since the second
floor together with the perimeter beam totals 36,000
sq ft, [Ex. 91-DJ it is clear from Flynn's testimony, he
had completed 34,600 sq ft by the time he left on
May 13th.
Even though Harlin had his superintendent take
photographs of Flynn's completed work on May 13,
1966, he admitted he could not show any part of
the second floor which Loyal had not completed other
than the 1400 sq ft shown in Exhibits 74-D and 77-D
[R. 351-352] And although Harlin took his own job
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journal, Exhibit 79-D, home one night during the
trial [R. 356] he admitted it did not state how much
of the second floor Flynn had completed by May 13,
1966. [R. 356] He further stated the small area which
Flynn had not yet completed as shown in Ex. 77-D did
not exceed 1,000 sq ft. [R. 346]
Although Harlin refused to concede Flynn had
done any work on the second floor other than the
actual 24,660 sq ft which had been poured upon,
[Ex. 88-D, 91-D, 92-DJ, his own photographs show
a substantial amount of forming and shoring work
which Mr. Flynn had completed on the second floor
and which had not been poured on when the photographs were taken on May 13, 1966. [Exs. 72-D, 74-D,
77-D, 78-D, 80-DJ Harlin admitted these photographs
showed a substantial amount of decking and forming
and shoring Flynn had done that he was not given
credit for [R. 301-302]. These photographs show Mr.
Flynn's work in a fully completed state and show
better than anything else how biased and prejudiced
Harlin was against Flynn in his testimony about work
completed on the second floor.
Austin Scott, foreman for the cement work both
for Mr. Flynn and the defendants, testified Flynn had
completed substantially all of the second floor and
25%-33% of the forming and shoring of the third
floor when he was ousted from the job. [R. 699, 735,
736] His testimony was confirmed by one of the
defendants' own witnesses, Marion Tamb, who was
building the columns for this project. Mr. Tamb
testified Flynn had done substantially all the forming
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and shoring of the second floor and the part he had
not done was only negligible. [R. 421 J
The trial judge refused to accept this testimony
of the plaintiff's witnesses and some of the defendants' own witnesses and seemed to be more pursuaded by Harlin's job journal than by all of the
other evidence even though Harlin himself
admitted none of the entries in the job journal were
in his handwriting, he didn't recall if he had been
present when the entries were made, and he could
not pick out any entry in the diary he had either
verified or not verified. [R.782-783 J Judge Croft said
he was convinced Mr. Flynn had only formed and
shored 5, 740 sq ft more than he had poured on the
second floor. The court admits on page 942 of the
record that in arriving at the 5,740 figure he
"assumed" only one-half of the remaining (part that
was not poured on) 11,480 sq ft on the second £lo.or
was done by Loyal Flynn by May 13th. It is clear
there is absolutely no basis in the record for the
court to make this assumption and he makes it arbitrarily. Based on this assumption he then goes on to
assume Harlin-Morrin's crews would have 5740 sq ft
of the second floor to complete, the entire third floor
of 30,000 sq ft and the roof area of 36,000 sq ft.
[R. 942] As stated above, these "assumptions' are
contrary to all of the testimony and the photographs.
The only basis the court used in "assuming"
there were 5 7+O sq ft remaining on the second floor
to form and shore is one journal entry for the date,
Tuesday, May 24, 1966 in Exhibit 79-D. The first
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paragraph on this page reads as follows:
"poured 140 yards on second floor, south end.
This is the center section. This finishes the
second floor slabs and beams."
Based upon that one entry, the court stated on page
940 of the record that it took Harlin-MoHin seven
working days with an increased crew to complete
shoring and pouring of the second floor. [R. 940 lines
18-20] He obviously meant May 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
23, and 24. Ho\vever, since this is the first entry on
l\1ay 24th, there is no showing it took the full day
of the 24th. It appears clear the pouriing took place
on the 24th but the forming and shoring [which is
what we are concerned with in computing cost per
sq ft to complete the subcontract] would have had to
be completed prior to that time.
Another erroneous assumption is that the Harlin1\!Iorrin crews worked each and every day for the
seven days in question. The court can find no justification for this conclusion in the Job Journal Oir any
of the other evidence. The diary entries do not show
any work being one by the defendants on the second
floor on May 16, 17, 23, 24th, which are four of
the seven days. The only entry on May 18th is: "We
are forming the southwest end of the second floor."
This must refer to the perimeter beam which Loyal
admitted had not been done for an area of about 600
sq ft, because the blueprints [Ex. 17-p, sheet S-3 J
clearly indicate the entire southwest area of the main
deck of the second floor was completely poured on
May 11th or two days before Loyal left the job. This
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is further admitted by defendants' Exhibit 88-D
which shows that on May 12th, 4,000 sq ft were
poured on the second floor by Loyal Flynn between
lines 9-15 and columns H-L. This is the southwest
end of the said second floor as can be seen from
pages S-3 of Exhibit 17-P. Furthermore the entry
on May 6th of the job journal Exhibit 79-D indicates
on that date Loyal Flynn was framing the southwest
corner of the second floor. Consequently any work
done by Harlin-Morrin on the soiUthwest area of the
second floor on May 18th, 1966, would be only a
small portion of the perimeter beam.
The entry on May 19th indicates the Morrin
crews were working on framing the second floor,
but it does not say where they were working. Since
the May 18th entry talks about the southwest area
which is the perimeter beam, it coiUld be assumed
they were working in this same area on May 19th.
Mr. Flynn admitted it would have taken his crews
two days to have completed this portion of the perimeter beam. [R. 891 J Mr. Flynn also admitted the
perimeter beam shown on Exhibit 74-D was not completed when he left because of the large thirty foot
(30 ft.) excavation hole which made it impossible
to set scaffolding material under the perimeter beam.
[R. 1060-1064] Defendant's own photographs show
this hole was still present when Mr. Flynn left the
job May 13, 1966, [Ex. 74-DJ and so it is possible
the Harlin-Morrin crews were working on this 600
sq ft area on May 19th since it was obviously completed after Flynn left. The only comment about
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the second floor on Friday, May 20, 1966, is a
statement that the Morrin crews were stripping the
second floor.
Consequently the only statements in the defendants' own job journal for the seven day period
the trial judge said the Harlin crews were working on
forming and shoring the second floor, are found on
Wednesday, May 18th, and Thursday, May 19th,
when the journal indicates there was some framing
being done on the southwest end of the said floor.
From this meager evidence, the trial court indulges
in an assumption that the beefed up crews were
working every minute of all seven days on forming
and shoring. Such a conclusion is clearly speculation
and conjecture and cannot be documented by any of
the evidence. Harlin himself admits there was much
other work in the building these crews were doing
after Flynn was ousted.
Another substantial erroneous assumption indulged in by the trial judge begins on page 941 of
the record where he states " ... the cost to form and
shore 24,660 sq ft of the second floor as disclosed
on Exhibit 93-P was $16,880 according to the computation." This shows the trial judge used the figure of
$16,880 for all his computations which he set forth
on his own charts. The $16,880 appears on the upper left hand corner of the first sheet of Exhibit 93-P.
This figure was taken from the bottom line of Exhibit 91-D which had been introduced by the defendants. Exhibit 93-P was merely the answers to a
hypothetical question varying some of the figures on
41

Exhibits 91-D and 92-D. CR. 298-308 J This hypothetical question was based upon facts presented
earlier during the trial by plaintiff's witnesses without any objections at that time by the defendants.
However, Exhibit 93-D was never intended to
change all of the erroneous figures on Exhibits 91-D
and 92-D. Only the figures dealing with the amount
of square foot area completed by Loyal Flynn were
changed to show what different results would be
reached if the jury used the testimony of Flynn's
witnesses rather than defendants. Since these changes
as to total area justified a $20,000 profit on Exhibit
93-D, there was no need to change the other erroneous figures such as the $16,880, the 9 cents per sq ft
to pour, etc. These other errors could easily be
pointed out in closing argument.
It should be clearly stated plaintiff never admitted the $16,880 figure was accurate as the cost
to form and pour 24,660 sq ft of the second floor.
Such a result cannot be justified if we view the
evidence most favorably to the plaintiff. This is true
because Exhibit 91-D arrives at the $16,880 figure
after deducting $4, 152 from $21,032. This latter
figure is set forth on Exhibit 91-D to be the labor expended by Flynn and Harlin prior to May 15, 1966.
Exhibit 91-D shows the $21,032 is made up of
$1211.00 spent by Flynn plus $19,821 which Harlin
testified he had paid out for Flynn's payroll. This
figure of $19,821 is Harlin's figure CR. 312-313] and
not Flynn's and is denied by Flynn as being accurate.
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Flynn's evidence on Exhibit 63-P shows the
total labor costs were $18,661.88 and not $21,032.00
as Mr. Harlin set forth on Exhibit 91-D. Mr. Flynn's
figures on Exhibit 63-P are taken from the actual
daily time record sheets made out by Mr. Flynn
each day on forms submitted to him by Mr. Harlin.
[Ex. 39-P, 40-P; R. 637, 1040-1043] These records
were there for the jury to use and are the best evidence as to the amounts paid by Harlin. This $2500
difference in total labor costs makes a substantial
difference in the result which the trial judge would
reach had he used the plaintiff's figures and reviewed
the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
rather than viewing it in a light most favorable to
the defendants as he did when he used defendants
Exhibits 91-D and the figures thereon.
If we use the labor costs found in Exhibits 39-P,
40-P and 63-P of $18,661.88, and if we further assume everything the trial judge said was corect about
the amount of work Flynn had completed on the
second and third floors, the trial judge still should
have awarded $6,510.19 to Loyal Flynn for lost
profits. This conclusion is arrived at as follows:

( 1) Judge Croft said 24,660 sq ft
were formed, shored and poured on
the second floor. He also stated he
would allow Loyal 5 740 sq ft as an
area that had been formed and
shored but not poured on on the
second floor.
30,360 sq ft
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(2) Loyal's labor costs to May 15,
1966 per Exhibits 39-P, 40-P and
63-P
$18,661.88
(3) Labor costs to pour one-half of
the basement and the entire first
floor per Exhibit 91-D. This exhibit
used 9 cents per sq ft which was
determined by the defendants to be
an accurate figure. Plaintiff disputes this figure because part of the
$1211 cost which he paid as shown
on Exhibit 91-D were used by his
crews to bring lumber materials
from Trade Tech and Midvale Elementary School and to begin setting these upon the second floor.
[ R. 902] All the parties agreed the
initial cost to get the crews going
would be greater until they reach
their maximum efficiency. However, the plaintiff will use the 9
cents per sq ft here because the
trial judge did.

$4, 152.66

(4) Labor costs to pour 24,660 sq
ft of the second floor at 9 cents per
sq ft

$2,219.40

( 5) Labor costs to form and shore
[but not pour] whatever area
Loyal Flynn had done on the
second floor by May 15, 1966 (2) [(3)
(4)]
$12,290.42

+

(6) Using Judge Croft's figure of
30,360 sq ft which Loyal Flynn had
formed and shored [24,660
5 740] and the labor costs of

+
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--$12,290.42 as determined in (5)
above, we obtain the cost to form
and shore (get the deck ready to
pour) a sq ft of floor space while
Loyal was on the job

$.40

( 7) Total floor space left to form
and shore according to Judge Croft:
Second floor, 5 740 sq ft; third floor,
30,000 sq ft; roof and perimeter
beam on roof, 36,000 sq ft
71,700 sq ft

C8) Labor costs to form and shore
71,700 sq ft at .40 cents per sq ft
$28,680.00
( 9) Remaining floor area to pour:
basement, 13,770 sq ft [Ex. 91-DJ;
First floor, none; second floor,
11,340 [36,000 less 24,460]; third
floor, 30,000; roof and perimeter
beam, 36,000
91,110 sq ft
(10) Cost to pour 91,110 sq ft at 9
cents per sq ft

$8, 199. 90

( 11) Labor costs to complete the
subcontract after May 15th [ ( 8) +
(10)].
$36,879.90
C12) Labor costs to perform subcontract [ (2)
11)]
$55,541.78

+(

(13) Eleven per cent of (12) for
workman compensation, FICA, liability insurance, and unemployment compensation

$6,109.59

C14) Total
labor plus
state
charges [ ( 12) + (13)] according
to Judge Croft's analysis
$61,651.37
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( 15) Total materials needed on
the job according to Loyal's witnesses and Exhibit 48-P
$20,215.88
( 16) Total labor and materials
cost to complete all work required
by the subcontract
$81,867.25
( 17)

Subcontract price [Ex. 18-PJ $86,000.00

( 18)

Change order [Ex. 41-PJ

( 19) Total subcontract and
change order
(20) Profit Loyal Flynn would
haverealized [(19)- (16)]

$2,377.44
$88,377.44
$6,510.19

If instead of looking at the evidence most favorably to defendants, we look at the evidence in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the profit figure is
substantially increased and we see the jury's verdict
of $20,000 was justified:
( 1 ) Area formed and shored on
the 2nd floor according to plaintiff's witnesses
34,500 sq ft
( 2) Amount of floor space formed
and shored on the third floor 25% of 30,000 sq ft
7,500 sq ft
( 3) Total area formed and shored
(prepare deck for pour) by May
13, 1966
42,000sqft
(4) Loyal's labor costs to May 15,
1966 per Ex. 39-P, 40-P and 63-P
$18,661.88
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( 5) Labor costs to pour one-half
of the basement and the entire first
floor per defendant's Exhibit 91-D
at 9 cents per sq ft

$4,152.06

(6) Labor costs to pour 24,660 sq
ft of the second floor which everybody admits was poured when
Loyal left

$2,219.40

( 7) Total cost to pour the area
that was poured by May 13, 1966
(6) J
[ (5)

$6,371.46

+

( 8) Labor costs to form and shore
42,000 sq ft [ (4) - (7) J
$12,290.42

( 9) Cost to form and shore a sq ft
of floor space with Loyal's crews
[ (8) divided by (3) J. This compares favorably with Mr. Flynn's
estimate it would take him approximately 30 cents per sq ft to complete the forming and shoring after
May 13, 1966 [R. 903]

.29 cents

( 10) Total floor space left to form
and shore: second floor, 1,500;
third floor, 22,500; roof and perimeter beams, 36,000
60,000 sq ft
( 11 ) The cost to form and shore
the balance of the building [ ( 10)
x (9) J
$17,400.00
( 12) Remaining floor area to
pour: basement, 13,770; first floor,
none; second floor, 11,340; third
floor, 30,000; roof and perimeter
beam, 36,000
91, 110 sq ft
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( 13) The cost to pour the balance
of the building at 9 cents per
sq ft

$8,199.90

( 14) Labor costs to complete subcontract by forming, shoring and
pouring remainder of the building
after May 15, 1966 [ ( 11)
(13)]
$25,599.90

+

( 15) Labor costs for all of subcontract work [ (4)
(14) J
$44,261.78

+

( 16) Eleven percent of ( 15) for
state charges
( 17) Total labor plus state
charges

$4,868.80
$49,130.58

( 18) Total material needed on job
according to Loyal's witnesses and
Exhibit 48-P.
$20,215.88
(19) Total cost for labor and material to fully perform the subcontract [ ( 17)
C18) J
$69,346.46

+

(20)

Subcontract price

(21)

Change order

$86,000.00
$2,377.44

(22) Total subcontract and
change order
C23) Profit all0iwa ble
(19) J

[ ( 22)

$88,377.44
-

$19,030.98

From the foregoing analysis, it appears clear the
$20,000 special jury verdict was based upon substan48

tial competent evidence, if we look at the evidence in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. If we use
Mr. Scott's testimony that one-third of the third floor
had been completed instead of twenty-five percent
C25 % ) , the allowable profit would be even greater.
[Ex. 93-DJ The plaintiff has used the lower figure
of twenty-five percent (25%) to show the jury's
verdict was still within the lower limits of the plaintiff's testimony.
Moreover, the plaintiff has presented the above
analysis using the defendants' labor cost of 9 cents
per sq ft to pour which as pointed out, supra, is too
high because it is based upon the defendants' erroneous assumption that all of the $1211 payroll in
February and March went to pouring activities by
Mr. Flynn. [Ex. 91-DJ Mr. Flynn's witnesses testified
they spent much of the time in February and March
bringing truck loads of material from the Trade Tech
and Midvale Elementary School sites and getting the
materials cut up and prepared [R. 688-694, 902];
and the defendants' own job Journal confirms this
[Ex. 79-D, entry for March 10, 1966, R. 308-309)
Consequently a large portion of the $1211 would have
gone for non-pouring activities; and the 9 cents per
sq ft figure for pouring would be reduced accordingly.
This would change all of the other figures in the cost
analysis set forth above; and would result in a profit
greater than $20,000.
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IV
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT vVHICH THE JURY
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS DAMAGES BECAUSE THE SAID DA1\1AGES WERE ASCERTAINABLE AS OF A DATE CERTAIN.
In Count I of his complaint, the plaintiff asks
for $25,000 damages for his lost profits together with
interest on the said award. [R. 2J It was stipulated
by the parties the issue of interest would be reserved
and be decided by the trial judge after the jury
verdict was returned; and this issue would not go
to the jury. CR. 914] The trial judge said he thought
the matter of interest was merely a mathematical
computation that we ought not to burden the jury
with. [R. 914-915] After the jury returned its
verdict in the amount of $5,000 for the wrongful
conversion of the plaintiff's materials, the court added
interest to this amount at the rate of 6% per annum
from August 25, 1966 to the date the judgment was
entered. [See paragraph 3 of Judgment on Verdict,
R. 163] The August 25, 1966, date was used by the
trial court, because this is the date Mr. Harlin said
his crews completed the work specified in Loyal's
subcontract. CR. 864]
Obviously since the trial judge took the case
away from the jury on lost profits there would be no
award upon which to add interest. However as
pointed out above in this brief, the jury verdict should
be reinstated and the plaintiff submits he is entitled
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to interest on the said $20,000 at the rate of 6% per
annum from August 25, 1966 through February 1,
1972, the date the jury returned the verdict and
interest at the rate of 8% from February 1, 1972,
until the verdict is paid.
Since the evidence shows what Mr. Flynn's labor
and materials costs would have been had he completed the job, it is clear the jury could ascertain the
damages as of August 25, 1966. Under these circumstances the rule of law in Utah is that interest should
be computed from that date. Fell v. Union Pacific
RR Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907); Ralph E.
Keller v. Deseret Mortu.ary Company, 23 Utah 2d 1,
455 P. 2d 197 (1969); Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v.
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist., 61 U.149,
211 Pac. 981; 13 Am Jur 2d 85 § 83 Interest as Damages; 36 ALR 2d 337 "Interest on Damages for Period
before Judgment for Injury to, or Detention, Loss or
Destruction of, Property".
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v
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON
EACH SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION IN HIS
COMPLAINT AND ALSO AS THE PREVAILING
PARTY ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE DEFENDANTS'
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS
EXECUTED A PAYMENT BOND IN THIS CASE;
THE PLAINTIFF BROUGHT THIS ACTION
AGAINST THE BONDING COMPANY AND BECAUSE SECTION 14-1-8 UCA - 1953 DIRECTS
ATTORNEYS FEES TO BE AWARDED.
Section 14-1-1 UCA-1953 as amended provides
certain bonds are required when any public construction projects are undertaken. One of the bonds
so required is a payment bond in an amount to be
fixed by the contracting body solely for the protection
of persons supplying labor or materials to the contractor or his subcontractors in the prosecution of
the work provided for in the contract. [ 14-1-5 (2)
UCA - 1953 J Exhibit 66-P is the contract between
the Utah State Building Board and the joint venture
for the construction of the Biological Science Building. Article 3 of this contract provides the
venture will furnish to the owner a 100% payment bond;
and a copy of the payment bond executed in this case
is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 2 and is by
reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof
at this time. A blank copy of the payment bond
called for in the plans and specifications was admitted
into evidence as Exhibit 94-P CR. 910]
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The last labor was done by Loyal Flynn and the
last materials furnished by him on May 13, 1966.
Ninety days thereafter or on August 13, 1966 he had
not been paid for his labor. Ten days later or on
August 23, 1966, he filed his complaint in the District
Court of Salt Lake County naming as one of the defendants therein, the bonding company, General Insurance Company of America, a Washington corporation. [R. 1 J Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint
is a cause of action against the bonding company for
recovery of the amounts due pursuant to the terms
of the bond together with attorney's fees pursuant
to Section 14-1-8 UCA - 1953 [R. 4-6]
Although Section 14-1-6 does not require a formal written notice of claim by a subcontractor who
has a direct contractual relationship with the general
contractor, Mr. Flynn did in fact give a written
notice of his claim and his intention to commence a
lawsuit if this matter could not be amicably settled.
This written claim was in the form of a letter dated
May 19, 1966 from Mr. Flynn's counsel todefendants'
counsel; and was admitted into evidence as Exhibit
60-P. In this letter Mr. Flynn asked to be reinstated
in his job and further stated if a lawsuit was necessary,
his estimate of lost profits would be between $25,000
and $30,000.
Under the circumstances set forth above, the
plaintiff alleges he is entitled to the protection of
the Utah bonding statute and is entitled to judgment
against the bonding company, General Insurance
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Company of America, on the fourth count or cause of
action set forth in his complaint.
Section 14-1-8 UCA - 1953 as amended provides
as follows:
In any
"14-1-8 Attorney's fees allowed action brought upon either of the bonds provided herein, ... the prevailing party upon
each separate cause of action, shall recover
a reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed as
costs."
The plaintiff submits every condition precedent necessary to fulfill the operation of this section has been
completed by him in the instant case and he is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee. The jury clearly
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on every
count in the plaintiff's complaint and found against
the defendant insofar as the allegations of the counterclaim were concerned. [R. 146-147]
Section 14-1-8 does not make attorney's fees a
discretionary matter with the trial judge. It uses the
word "shall" instead of the word "may." The plaintiff submits this provision makes it mandatory upon
a trial court to award attorney's fees upon each separate cause of action to the prevailing party thereon.
After the trial, the plaintiff made a motion to
have attorney's fees awarded pursuant to Section
14-1-8 [ R. 149 J and, as required by Section 14-1-8,
the plaintiff included attorney's fees as one of the
costs of this action in his memorandum of costs and
disbursements. [R. 166]
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The parties stipulated the issue of attorney's fees
could be decided by the trial judge instead of the
jury and the said issue would be decided after the
jury returned its verdict. [R. 914-915] At a separate hearing held on February 9, 1972, pursuant to
formal notice [R. 150] for the purpose of submitting
evidence bearing on the issue of attorney's fees, three
practicing Salt Lake Community attorneys appeared
in support of the plaintiff's request to have attorney's
fees awarded. These three attorneys were James A.
Mcintosh, attorney for the plaintiff, Clayton D. Fairbourn and Ronald L. Spratling, Jr. [R. 953-978] Mr.
Fairbourn and Mr. Spratling testified they devoted a
substantial part of their practice to handling cases
for general contract0irs and subcontractors. The testimony of these witnesses was that $7500.00 would be
a reasonable attorney's fee based upon the amount
of time which had been spent on this case, the size of
the recovery, the defense of the counterclaim, etc.
The services rendered by plaintiff's counsel were set
forth in Exhibit 1-M which was presented at the said
hearing and which was reviewed by the attorneys.
[R. 157-160]
The plaintiff submits the award of $7500 for
attorney's fees is reasonable based upon the evidence
submitted at the hearing before Judge Croft on February 9, 1972. [R. 953-980] The defendants alleged
in their counterclaim $5000 would be a reasonable
attorney's fees for bringing their counterclaim alone.
[R. 11, tf7] If $5,000 is a reasonable attorney's fees
for prosecuting the counterclaim, certainly $7500 is
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a reasonable attorney's fees for not only defending
the counterclaim but prosecuting all four counts
of the plaintiff's complaint as well.
Under these circumstances the plaintiff submits
he is entitled to be awarded $7500 as a reasonable
attorneys fees together with such further amounts as
would be reasonable for services rendered from the
date of the special hearing on attorney's fees on
February 9, 1972 through the prosecution of this appeal and for any services rendered for any post-appeal
services, motions, hearings, etc.
The defendants did not cross-appeal from paragraph 4 of the judgment requiring them to pay their
own attorney's fees [R. 175 J Consequently no issue
can be raised in this case as to whether the defendants' might be entitled to an attorney's fee either as
a primary award or as an offsetting award against
judgment rendered to the plaintiff.

VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN HIS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, NOR DID HE ERR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE CERTAIN OF THE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS
TAKEN AS A WHOLE CORRECTLY STATE THE
LAW PERTAINING TO THIS CASE.
In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge
stated:
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"You are to consider all of these instructions
as a whole and are to regard each instruction in the light of all the others. The order
in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance."
[Instruction No. 1, R. 118]
Not only must the instructions be read together as a
whole, but the law is clear the trial judge will not be
reversed for either the failure to give instructions or
the giving of instructions unless he has ( 1) committed
error and ( 2) the error is prejudicial to one of the
parties.
In the instant case the plaintiff submits there is
no prejudicial error committed in any of the instructions. The various laws pertaining to the instructions
have already been set forth hereinabove in this
brief under each separate argument heading and
they will not be repeated at this time.
The defendants objected to the court's Instructions 11, 14, 17 and 18. [R. 917-918] The defendants'
objection to Instruction No. 11 is simply that it gave
undue emphasis to the plaintiff's position, which a
reading of the instruction shows it clearly does not
do. The defendants further allege Instruction No. 11
should not be given because there is no evidence from
which a jury can determine the value of labor and
materials Loyal Flynn put on the project for which
he has not been paid. As pointed out above, the
$20,000 lost profits verdict returned by the jury was
well within the evidence and shows the value of
labor could be determined.
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The defendants also objected to the court's refusal to give their requested Instructions No. 4 and 5
[ R. 919 J These instructions appear at R. 110-111.
Their proposed Instruction No. 4 deals with the
plaintiff's claim against the bonding company. This
instruction pertains to matters connected with issues
raised by Joe Flynn who was ultimately dismissed
from the action. Insofar as it pertains to matters
dealing with Loyal Flynn's work, the general law
was clearly covered in the court's other instructions.
The defendants' proposed Instruction No. 5 dealt
with the defendants' rights to take over Flynn's work
if there .had been a breach of the subcontract by
Flynn. These matters were amply covered in the
court's general instructions to the jury dealing with
these same issues.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth a hove, it is respectfully
requested this Honorable Court decide the issues
herein as follows:
1. To enter its order or direct the trial court

to enter an order awarding judgment in favor of
the plaintiff L. W. Flynn and against the defendants
and each of them in the amount of $20,000 in accordance with the jury verdict; together with interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from August 25,
1966, through February 1, 1972, together with further interest on those amounts at the rate of 8% per
anum from February 1, 1972, to the date the judgment is paid.
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--2. To enter its order or to instruct the trial court
to enter its order awarding judgment to the plaintiff
L. W. Flynn and against the defendant General
Insurance Company of America for the amount of
$7500 as a reasonable attorney's fees foir services
rendered by the plaintiff's attorney through the filing
of the notice of appeal; and to award additional attoifney's fees for the services plaintiff's attorney rendered
in connection with prosecuting this appeal and any
post-appeal services which might be necessairy.
3. To award costs of this appeal to the plaintiff.
4. To dismiss the defendants' cross-appeal and
all issues raised therein.
5. To award such other relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES A. McINTOSH
Attorney for Appellant and
Cross-Respondent
15 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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